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【CAR】战略、CEO选择和企业绩效之间的关系

[发布日期]:2018-10-18  [浏览次数]:

THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH. September 2018

战略、CEO选择和企业绩效之间的关系

作者:MARGARET A. ABERNETHY(The University of Melbourne)

YU FLORA KUANG(The University of Melbourne)

BO QIN(The University of Melbourne)

摘要:我们研究一家公司的战略重点是否会影响其对新CEO的选择,以及什么条件下这种任命能够增加公司价值。更具体地说,这项研究研究了当探矿企业(即追求探矿者型战略的企业)选择具有高社会资本的CEO时的增值效应。我们认为,由公司战略驱动的不确定性将决定选择具有高社会资本的CEO;这样的CEO可以利用他们的社会网络来降低不确定性,因而对公司而言很有价值。然而,先前的研究表明,具有高社会资本的CEO可以从事不利于公司价值的行为。为了减少这种情况发生的可能性,我们评估公司治理是否可以在任命具有高社会资本的CEO的勘探公司中发挥作用。 借鉴14年期间CEO继任的档案数据,我们发现,探矿公司有更大的动机去任命具有高社会资本的CEO。我们还发现,任命具有高社会资本的CEO的勘探公司可以改善他们的业绩。此外,在公司治理良好的勘探公司中,选择高社会资本CEO的增值效应更强。

关键词:公司战略;社会资本;CEO选择;企业管理;公司价值

The Relation between Strategy, CEO Selection, and Firm Performance

MARGARET A. ABERNETHY (The University of Melbourne),YU FLORA KUANG (The University of Melbourne),BO QIN (The University of Melbourne)

ABSTRACT

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.

Keywords: Firm strategy; Social capital; CEO selection; Corporate governance; Firm value

原文链接:https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1911-3846.12463

翻译:王霄霄



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