Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Volume 48, February 2018
退市压力、高管薪酬与公司欺诈：来自中国的证据
作者：Fangzhao Zhou Qian(School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, Jiangsu, China),
Zenan Zhang (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, Jiangsu, China),
Jun Yang (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, Jiangsu, China)，
Yunpeng Su(College of Management & Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China),
Yunbi An(Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada)
摘要：本文从退市压力的角度研究了我国上市公司高管薪酬与公司欺诈发生的关系。我们发现，鉴于中国股票市场独特的上市和退市制度，退市压力直接导致了欺诈的发生，尤其是信息披露违规的发生。我们还发现，不管是否存在退市压力，薪酬相对较低的CEO和CFO更有可能进行欺诈。然而，退市压力削弱了高管薪酬与企业欺诈的负相关关系。最后，当考虑股权激励时，CEO总薪酬对欺诈的影响取决于退市压力。对于没有退市压力的公司来说，高CEO总薪酬对欺诈行为具有威慑作用，而对于有退市压力的公司来说，这种影响消失。
关键词：退市压力；公司欺诈；高管薪酬
Delisting pressure, executive compensation, and corporate fraud: Evidence from China
Fangzhao Zhou Qian(School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, Jiangsu, China), Zenan Zhang (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, Jiangsu, China), Jun Yang (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, Jiangsu, China)，Yunpeng Su(College of Management & Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China), Yunbi An(Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada)
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and the incidence of corporate fraud in Chinese listed companies from the perspective of delisting pressure. We find that delisting pressure directly contributes to the incidence of fraud, especially the incidence of information disclosure violations, given the unique listing and delisting systems in the Chinese stock market. We also find that CEOs and CFOs with relatively low pay are more likely to commit fraud, regardless of whether or not delisting pressure is present. However, delisting pressure weakens the negative relationship between executive pay and the likelihood of corporate fraud. Finally, when equity incentives are also considered, the effect of CEOs' total compensation on fraud is contingent on delisting pressure. High CEOs' total compensation has a deterring effect on fraud for firms with no delisting pressure, while this effect disappears for firms with delisting pressure.
Keywords: Delisting pressure；Corporate fraud；Executive compensation
原文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X17304316#!
翻译：施懿
