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【JAR】提高执法力度对财务报告质量和审计质量的影响

[发布日期]:2019-02-26  [浏览次数]:

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH. 13 November 2018

提高执法力度对财务报告质量和审计质量的影响

作者:RALF EWERT(University of Graz)

ALFRED WAGENHOFER(University of Graz)

摘要:政策制定和实证研究中广泛存在的假设是,增加公共执法的力度可以提高财务报告质量和审计质量。本文提供了一个更细微的观点。在一个能够管理收益的经理,战略审计师和执法机构的模型中,我们发现在弱执法体制下执法和审计相互补充,但在强执法体制下可以相互替代。虽然强有力的执法经常会减弱盈余管理,但加强执法的不同工具的影响是模棱两可的。我们表明,这些工具会改善或削弱财务报告质量和审计质量,具体取决于生产风险、会计系统特征以及与执法相关的审计范围。

关键词:盈余管理;执行;审计;财务报告质量;审计质量

Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality

RALF EWERT(University of Graz);ALFRED WAGENHOFER(University of Graz)

ABSTRACT

A widely held assumption in policy making and empirical research is that increasing the strength of public enforcement improves financial reporting quality and audit quality. This paper provides a more nuanced view. In a model with a manager who can manage earnings, a strategic auditor, and

an enforcement institution, we show that enforcement and auditing are complements in a weak enforcement regime but can be substitutes in a strong regime. Although stronger enforcement always mitigates earnings management, the effects of different instruments of strengthening enforcement are ambiguous. We show that they can improve or impair financial reporting quality and audit quality, depending on production risk, accounting system characteristics, and the scope of auditing relative to enforcement.

Keywords: earnings management; enforcement; auditing; financial reporting quality; audit quality

原文链接:https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12251

翻译:王霄霄



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