一、主题：Count on your Subordinates: Executives’ Horizons and Innovation Efficiency pressure

二、主讲人：高磊，爱荷华州立大学Ivy商学院金融学助理教授。乔治亚大学金融博士毕业。主要研究领域：金融市场、微观结构、资产回报预测、实证公司财务、公司监管、企业文化、文本分析和机器学习等。高磊教授的研究成果发表在Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Corporate Finance、美国科学院会刊（PNAS）等国外金融界高水平期刊上。

三、时间：2018年11月19日（周一），12:30-13:30

四、地点：学院南路校区主教学楼913会议室

五、主持人：朱一峰，太阳集团tyc539讲师

六、项目支持：本项目由“太阳集团tyc539国际合作处引智项目”支持

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between executives’ horizons and firms’ innovation efficiency. Motivated by Acharya, Myers, and Rajan’s (2011) theory, we devise a measure of internal governance based on the difference in expected horizons between a CEO and her subordinates. Consistent with our conjecture, we find robust evidence that subordinate managers can effectively monitor the CEO. Internal governance has a stronger effect on innovation efficiency for firms with elder, generalist CEOs and when the number subordinates on the board is higher. However, while the presence of powerful CEOs attenuates the effect, overconfident CEOs do not negate the internal governance effect.