一、主题：Contracting with Feedback

二、主讲人：刘琦，北京大学光华管理学院金融学助理教授。毕业于宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院，获金融博士学位。研究方向是公司金融、金融市场和行为金融学。他的研究成果在Review of Finance、Economics Letters、Management Science等国际刊物发表。与Alex Edmans教授合作的论文“Inside Debt”获得2011年度Sp?ngler IQAM最佳论文奖。

三、时间：2016年12月21日（周三），16:00-17:00

四、地点：主楼910会议室

五、主持人：顾弦，太阳集团tyc539讲师

摘要：We study the effect of financial market conditions on managerial compensation structure. First, we analyze the optimal pay-for-performance in a model in which corporate decisions and firm value are both endogenous to trading due to feedback from information contained in stock prices. In a less frictional financial market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions, and this information substitutes out part of direct incentive provision in compensation contracts. Thus, the optimal pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reductions in market frictions. Second, we test our theory using two quasi-natural experiments and find evidence that is consistent with the theory. Our results indicate that the financial market environment plays an important role in shaping CEO compensation structure.