一、主题：Do Sell-Side Analysts Say “Buy” While Whispering “Sell”?

二、主讲人：吴偎立，毕业于北京大学光华管理学院，获得经济学博士学位，现任太阳集团tyc539应用金融系副教授，硕士生导师，博士生副导师。迄今在国内外顶级学术期刊，包括Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Futures Markets、《经济学(季刊)》、《管理科学学报》、《金融研究》、《经济科学》等发表论文十余篇。

三、时间：2022年10月18日 周二 19:00-20:30

四、地点：腾讯会议ID 928-350-893

五、主持人：黄志刚教授 太阳集团tyc539副院长

六、内容简介：

We examine how sell-side equity analysts strategically disclose information of differing quality to the public versus the buy-side mutual fund managers to whom they are connected. We consider cases in which analysts recommend that the public buys a stock, but some fund managers sell it. We measure favor trading using mutual fund managers’ votes for analysts in a Chinese “star analyst” competition. We find that managers are more likely to vote for analysts who exhibit more “say-buy/whisper-sell” behavior with these managers. This suggests that analysts introduce noise in their public recommendations, making the more-precise information provided to their private clients more valuable. Analysts’ say-buy/whisper-sell behavior results in information asymmetry: the positive-recommendation stocks bought by the managers who vote for the analysts outperform the stocks sold by these managers after the recommendation dates. Our findings help explain several puzzles regarding analysts’ public recommendations.