江深哲|191期双周学术论坛：On the Pacific Salmon Treaty

一、主题：On the Pacific Salmon Treaty

二、主讲人：江深哲，美国德克萨斯州农工大学经济学博士，南开大学金融学硕士，上海交通大学物理学学士，主要研究领域为观经济学、动态合同、资产定价、货币经济学。

三、时间：2017年2月22日（周三），12:30-13:30

四、地点：学院南路校区主教学楼910会议室

五、主持人：黄志刚，太阳集团tyc539副教授

ABSTRACT: This paper studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which was signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast. Moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other. If a country’s observed output is suspiciously too high, the treaty either reduces the country’s future share, or asks the country to make a monetary transfer to its opponent. A calibrated version of our model shows that it is optimal for the U.S. to pay Canada $244.9 million every 25.3 years. Switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.47%.